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As people age they would like to work less. We observe, however, that for 
most persons, retirement is abrupt. The typical person retires from a job 
at which he was working full time, although many work part time on an- 
other job after retirement. Because retirement is a discrete outcome, it is 
natural to think of it in a qualitative choice framework. But retirement 
also has a time dimension, age, which not only characterizes retirement 
but affects the desire for it as well. Thus it is natural to describe retirement 
within the context of  a continuous time qualitative choice model. In this 
spirit, we pursue a probability model of time to retirement (age of retire- 
ment). 
We  shall begin with a failure rate or hazard model specification com- 
mon in the statistical and biometric literature (see Cox 1972 or Kalbfleisch 
and Prentice 1973, for example). Such a model was recently used by Lan- 
caster (1979) to describe the duration of unemployment. Our model paral- 
lels his, with some slight extensions.' This model is essentially a reduced- 
form  specification.  In  particular,  it  seems to have  no natural  utility 
maximization or first choice interpretation common to qualitative choice 
models in the econometric literature (e.g., McFadden 1973; Hausman and 
Wise 1978). 
We then pursue another continuous time model of  retirement that we 
hope will  ultimately lend itself to a more structural interpretation  but 
which also maintains the advantages of the hazard model. The central 
idea is  to specify disturbances that follow a continuous time Brownian 
Jerry A. Hausman is professor of economics, Massachusetts Institute of  Technology, and 
research associate, National Bureau of Economic Research. David A. Wise is John F. Stam- 
baugh Professor of Political Economy, John F.  Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 
University, and research associate, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
We  are grateful for the extensive research assistance of  Andrew  Lo, Douglas Phillips, 
Lynn Paquette, and Robert Vishny. 
159 160  Jerry A. HausmadDavid A. Wise 
motion (or Wiener) process. (See, e.g., Cox and Miller 1965; Karlin and 
Taylor 1975.) This leads to retirement likelihoods that have much in com- 
mon with probit qualitative choice models while capturing the continuous 
time hazard idea as well. The specification of this model as we have set it 
up differs substantially from the hazard model. In particular, we make ex- 
plicit use of hours worked before retirement, a consideration that plays no 
role in the hazard model. To date, however, the specifications of this mod- 
el have not yielded entirely plausible results. We present the model none- 
theless, in the hope that our experience will be of interest to others facing 
similar problems. 
Empirical  analysis is based on the Longitudinal  Retirement History 
Survey (LRHS). The survey began in 1969 with over 11,000 persons who 
were aged 58-63  at that time. A series of  follow-up surveys were used to 
obtain information on these persons at two-year intervals through 1979. 
We use all six surveys. The LRHS provides detailed labor supply, social se- 
curity, earnings, health, and other information about those surveyed. To 
motivate the development below, we  shall have in mind observations on 
each individual at selected ages. 
The empirical focus of the paper is the effect of health and social securi- 
ty wealth, or social security payments, on retirement. Labor force partici- 
pation fell significantly during the period of  our data; the participation 
rate of  men fell particularly substantially. The rates for 60-64-year-olds 
and those 65 between 1969 and 1979 were as shown in the unnumbered ta- 
ble below. 
Year  60-64  65 + 
1969  75.8  27.4 
1971  74.0  26.3 
1973  68.9  23.4 
1975  65.4  21.9 
1977  62.6  19.9 
1979  61.1  20.3 
Part of this decline may have resulted from real increases in social security 
benefits, at least between  1969 and  1975. But counteracting influences 
were provided by increased real earnings during the beginning of the peri- 
od and by large increases in future social security benefits from continued 
work. This latter effect has been emphasized by Blinder et al. (1980). Our 
models attempt to distinguish the effects of these influences. 
The estimates based on both of the models that we use suggest a strong 
effect of social security benefits on the probability of retirement, with the 
increase in benefits between 1969 and 1975 accounting for possibly a 3%- 
5%  increase in the probability of retirement for men 62-66.  Both models 
suggest that increases in real earnings decrease the probability of retire- 161  Social Security, Health Status, and Retirement 
ment. Results based on the hazard model indicate that increases in future 
social security benefits decrease the probability of retirement, while the 
initial  results of  the  Wiener  model suggest  the  opposite.  Because  the 
Brownian motion model is in the early stages of formulation and the re- 
sults are preliminary, it may be premature to attempt to explain the differ- 
ences in results. 
We begin by setting forth the hazard model. Then we present descrip- 
tive statistics that help motivate our specification of this model. For con- 
venience, we also present data that help to understand our formulation of 
the Brownian motion alternative. After presenting estimates based on the 
hazard model, we  describe a continuous time model of retirement based 
on a Brownian motion process and then present initial estimates based on 
this model. 
6.1  The Proportional Hazard Approach 
6.1.1  The Model 
Suppose the probability that a person has retired by age t is given by 
where 8 > 0. This is a convenient probability specification with the intu- 
itive property that the probability of retirement goes to one as t gets large. 
For example, if 8 were a function only of age, with 19 (t)  =  f(t)  = t"-l/a,  a 
> 0, then G(t)  would be 1 -  exp[t"/c~~]-~,  with exp[*]-'  going to zero as t 
increases. Note thatf(t) is increasing with age if a  > 1 and decreasing with 
ageif0 < CY  < 1. 
Associated with this "cumulative distribution"  function is the density 
function 
describing the likelihood of retirement at ages t (0 < t < a).  The "instan- 
taneous"  hazard rate describes the conditional likelihood of retirement at 
age t,  given that the person has not retired before t. It is simply 
(3) 
To make the distribution function G(t)  a function of individual attri- 
butes, the instantaneous hazard rate 8 is parameterized in terms of attri- 
butes X, in this case including age itself. For expository purposes, it is use- 
ful to develop the specification in stages. Suppose first that 8 is a function 
of age t and of individual attributes XI  that do not change with age such 162  Jerry A. Hausman/David A. Wise 
that 8(t) = exl@-f(t)  = exI@I.P-I/a,  where PI  is a vector of parameters and 
XI a vector of attributes. In this case, the probability of being retired by 
age t is G(t) = 1 -  exp[exI@I  * P/a2]  -  I. 
Now suppose that there are unobserved as well as observed determi- 
nants of retirement. A convenient way to allow for unobserved individual 
attributes is to specify a random individual-specific term  v that enters 8 
such that 
(4)  8(t) = v.exl@I.P-l/a. 
Note that v is time invariant; it simply induces a proportional shift in the 
hazard function 8( a)  over all values of age t. The same is true for differ- 
ences in XI. 
If we assume that v has a gamma distribution over individuals (0 < v < 
m), we can obtain a closed-form solution for G(t).3  In particular, the prob- 
ability that a person with attributes XI has retired by age t is given by 
with the last term obtained after some manipulation. Although this ex- 
pression is not defined for a2  = 0, as the variance goes to zero, G(t;XI) 
goes to 1 -  exp($l@.P/a2)-I, the result with no random term. 
Finally, suppose that there are some measured individual attributes Xz 
that change with age. We again specify 8 in a separable manner as 
(6)  8(t) = u-ex1@1.X2(t).f(t)  . 
(7)  G(~;x)  = 1 -  [I + u2exp(XIPI) .  x2(7)  * f(7)d~i  . 
Now the probability of retirement by age t becomes 
The specification is completed by describing the integral 
(8)  Os'X2(7) 'f(7)dT . 
Since we  do not have continuous observations on X2, which would pre- 
sumably allow integration over the function X2(t) determined by such a 
path, we specify the integral using the piecewise linear formulation 
0s'  X~(T)  - f(7)d7 =  2  g2  @)P2  -  Yg\f(7)d7 ,  (9) 
where p denotes the period. For example, p  = 0 indicates the period be- 
tween age 54 and the age at the time of the first survey, p  = 1 indicates the 
period between the first and second survey, and so on. Note that 54 is tak- 
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en as an arbitrary starting point, implicitly assuming that no one would 
have retired before this age. The variable %(p) is the average of XZ  during 
period p,  and to@)  and t,@)  are the initial and final ages, respectively, of 
the person during period p.  (A discretely changing variable, like married 
or not, is taken to be the value of the variable the next time it is observed. 
If the variable is continuaus, like income, the average is obtained by as- 
suming that the variable followed a linear path over time.) We can also al- 
ter the specification of  0 to allow for a discontinuous jump in the hazard 
rate at any age t. For example, XI  can include dummy variables that as- 
sume nonzero values at particular ages. 
Given 0(t)  and G(t),  it is straightforward to specify the likelihood of  a 
variety of  sample observations (see, e.g.,  Lancaster 1979). In particular, 
in our case there are three possibilities: the person was retired when first 
surveyed at age t(  1) with corresponding probability  G[t(l)], the person 
had not retired by the last (Nth) survey period at age t(N)  with probability 
1 -  G[t(N)],  or the person retired between the nth and mth surveys, when 
he  was  aged  t(n) and  t(m), respectively,  with  probability  G[t(n)] - 
G[t(m)].  The likelihood function obtained from these terms may be maxi- 
mized to obtain estimates of the coefficients /3  on the variables X  and on 
age, as well as the variance u2 of u. 
6.1.2  Some Descriptive Statistics 
Before we discuss estimates based on this model, we shall present sum- 
mary statistics that help to motivate the model and our particular specifi- 
cation of it.  Although  our estimates are based  on non-self-employed 
males, for comparative purposes, we also present descriptive data for self- 
employed men and for women. Empirical hazard rates for non-self-em- 
ployed men are shown in table 6.1, by age and survey year. Tables 6.2  and 
6.3 contain analogous data for self-employed men and for women, re- 
spectively. These data show the proportion of those not retired in a given 
year who retired during the next two-year interval. First we observe that 
the pattern of rates for self-employed men is quite different from the pat- 
tern for the non-self-employed. In particular, the jump at age 62 is much 
less pronounced for the self-employed, and the rates thereafter are much 
lower. The rates for women, however, are not strikingly different from 
those for men. This suggests that the availability of social security at 62 
for the non-self-employed may play a substantial role in retirement behav- 
ior. 
The hazard rates for men are graphed in figure 6.1. While the rates in- 
crease rather smoothly to age 62, we  observe substantial jumps between 
ages 63 and 65 and then very little increase in the hazard rates after 65. 
This pattern would appear to  be inconsistent with a hazard rate 0(t) =  f(t) 
= t"-'/a that depends only on age and is always increasing in age for a > 
1. Thus we allow the hazard rate O( -)  to depend on individual attributes X, 164  Jerry A. HausmadDavid A. Wise 
Table 6.1  Retirement Hazard Rates for Non-Self-Employed Males, by 







































































Note: The hazard rate in year t is the ratio of the number of people who retire between years t 
and t  + 2 to the number of nonretired people in year t,  in percent. Numbers in parentheses 
are numbers of observations used to calculate hazards. 
as well as on age. In particular, this pattern motivates the assumption of 
the unobserved random terms u that induce proportional shifts in the haz- 
ard rate, given X  and t. 
The percentage of non-self-employed men that is retired is shown in ta- 
ble 6.4 and for each age and year.  Figure 6.2 presents the same data 
graphically. The most striking feature of  these data is the very marked in- 
crease between 1969 and 1973 in retirement rates of men 62-65. For exam- 
ple, 31% of 62-year-olds were retired in 1969; by 1973, almost 42% of this 165  Social Security, Health Status, and Retirement 



































































Note: The hazard rate in year t is the ratio of the number of people who retire between years 1 
and t t 2 to the number of nonretired people in year t, in percent. Numbers in parentheses 
are numbers of  observations used to calculate hazards. 
age group were retired. Note that the limited evidence provided in these 
data suggests little change in retirement rates after 1973. About 79% of 
65-year-olds were retired in both 1973 and in 1975. 
The estimates we present below depend in part on our definition of  re- 
tirement. We assume that a person is retired when he says that he is fully 
or partially retired. Although this may seem an obvious choice, on reflec- 
tion, it becomes clear that retirement status is ambiguous. For example, 
our definition does not correspond to zero hours of  work. While many 166  Jerry A. HausmadDavid A. Wise 
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32.5  38.4 
(274)  (  198) 
34.6  40.4 
(243)  (220) 
(242)  (  187)  (1 17) 
52.4  54.8  58.6 
(185)  (168)  (133) 
31.8  31.0  35.0 
55.2  68.6  65.4 
(181)  (137)  (78) 
(  107)  (85)  (67) 
60.7  61.2  61.2 
49.4  61.1  42.8 
(89)  (54)  (35) 
61.2  46.2  58.8 
(49)  (39)  (34) 
59.6  47.8 
50.0  53.3 
(26)  (30) 
44.8 




Note:  The hazard rate in year t is the ratio of the number of people who retire between years t 
and t + 2 to the number of nonretired people in year t, in percent. Numbers in parentheses 
are numbers of observations used to calculate hazards. 
people who are retired by our definition do not work at all, many do. In 
practice, our definition corresponds closely to retirement from a full-time 
or primary job. It is important to realize the significance of  this distinc- 
tion. It is possible, for example, that social security benefits have effects 
on retirement, by our definition, that are different from their effects on 
work after retirement. If hours of work are used to define retirement, the 
two types of  effect are confounded. We  have chosen to try to separate 
them. (Although we had intended to consider both retirement and work 
after retirement, we have been able to address only the first in this paper. 167  Social Security, Health Status, and Retirement 
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Fig. 6.1  Conditional retirement probabilities (hazards)  by age for non- 
self-employed males. 
In subsequent work we have addressed work after retirement. See Burtless 
and Moffitt [ 19831 .) 
The data in tables 6.5 and 6.6  help to clarify the distinction. Mean hours 
of work per week by retirement status and age, as well as employment sta- 
tus and sex, are shown in table 6.5. The first two columns of the table per- 
tain to non-self-employed men. Notice that mean hours of work per week 
decline with age if  those who are fully or partially retired are included in 
the sample. But among those who are not retired, there is virtually no de- 
cline between ages 58 and 63 and very little decline thereafter. Thus almost 
all of  the reduction in hours is due to zero or reduced hours of work 
among those who are retired.4  The same is true for self-employed men and 
for women. Most of the numbers in table 6.5 represent averages over two 
or three survey years.  The details by  year are shown in tables  6.A.l 
through  6.A.6. In addition to little decline in hours worked per week 
among the nonretired, table 6.A.6 shows that there is also very little de- 
cline in weeks worked per year among men who are not self-employed and 
not retired. 
While this  empirical fact is  not inconsistent with the hazard  model 
specification of  retirement, it is at variance with the standard form of the 
Brownian motion specification that we shall consider subsequently. 
6.1.3  Hazard Model Parameter Estimates 
The variables used in our analysis are defined as follows: 
Social security (SS) payments: The monthly payments a person would 
receive were he to retire at a given age. 168  Jerry A. HausmadDavid A. Wise 




































37.1  41.9 
(935)  (725) 
45.9  49.6 
(978)  (841) 
50.4  55.8 
(959)  (864) 
72.9  79.3 


















































Note: The number in parentheses is the number of observations used to calculate the associ- 
ated mean. 
Change in (A)  social security payments: The increment to monthly so- 
cial security payments were a person to  work for another year and then 
retire. 
Social security wealth: The present discounted value of social security 
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Fig. 6.2  Proportion retired by  age and year for non-self-employed 
males. 





















Totala  Retired 
42.4  42.8 
42.3  42.8 
41.8  42.2 
41.5  42.1 
41.0  42.1 
40.8  42.4 
39.3  41.5 
36.5  41.3 
33.8  41.2 
32.2  39.6 
30.0  38.8 
29.8  39.4 
28.2  37.1 
28.9  36.9 
25.9  35.6 
29.8  36.0 
Self-Employed 
~~  ~~~  ~  ~ 
Not 
Totala  Retired 
48.7  50.0 
47.2  49.6 
47.5  49.4 
46.7  49.0 
45.3  48.8 
43 .O  48.2 
42.0  49.2 
37.7  47.4 
37.6  45.6 
35.3  46.0 
37.0  47.0 
32.6  43.5 
34.7  47.2 
31.9  41.4 
31.6  43. I 
30.6  35.8 
Women 
Not 
Totala  Retired 
38.1  38.5 
37.1  38.0 
31.3  38.7 
36.5  38.2 
35.8  38.6 
34.1  38.0 
33.5  37.8 
30.5  36.4 
28.5  35.9 
26.7  35.2 
26.8  34.8 
24.8  34.3 
25.5  34.9 
24.0  29.5 
28.1  33.9 
21.1  29.9 
=Includes fully or partially retired. 170  Jerry A. HausmadDavid A. Wise 
Table 6.6  Mean of Weeks Worked per Year for Non-Self-Employed Men, by Age 
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50.4  50.2 
(610)  (449) 
50.1  49.7 
(551)  (449) 
50.1  49.7 
(492)  (401) 
50.2  49.4 
(229)  (195) 
49.5 
47.7 



































aFor 1971-79, the variable is one-half the number of weeks worked in the past two years, 
while the 1969 variable is usual weeks per year. The number in parentheses is the number of 
observations used to calculate the associated mean. 
Change in social security  wealth: The change in the present discounted 
value of  social security payments were a person to work for another 
year and then retire. 171  Social Security, Health Status, and Retirement 
Bad health: One if  the person reported that poor health  “limited the 
kind and amount of work” he could do, zero otherwise. 
Earnings: Estimated earnings were the person to  work for an additional 
year. 
Liquidassets: Total of liquid assets. 
Pension eligibility: One if the person would receive a private pension 
were he to retire, zero otherwise. 
Education: Years of  schooling. 
Dependents: Number of completely supported children. 
Age:  Years old. 
Because of limitations and apparent inaccuracies in reporting nonliquid 
assets in the RHS that, in particular, make it difficult to compare these as- 
sets from one year to  the next, we have not used these values in our analy- 
sis. After more concerted data cleaning and estimation, we will probably 
be able to  include nonliquid assets in future work. 
The results of four alternative specifications are presented in table 6.7. 
The first two use social security payments as an explanatory variable, 
while the next two use social security wealth instead.  Liquid assets are 
used in one of each of these groups. 
To interpret the parameter estimates it is helpful to consider a case 
simpler than ours, with the hazard O(t) = exlBl  P-I/a. In this case, the 
time T to retirement is given by E(7) = exp( -  XIDl  *a),  with ln[E(7)]  = 
-  XlBl  *a,  so that a unit increase in XI  yields a percentage change in E(7) 
equal to -Dl -a  .  Our model is more complicated, so that this simple re- 
sult does not hold, but it is still a useful guide to interpretation. To obtain 
a better idea of the effects of changes in the variables in our model we 
must present simulation results. We do  this after discussing the parameter 
estimates themselves. 
First we find that an increase in monthly social security payments in- 
creases the likelihood of retirement after age 62, while larger increments in 
payments prolong work. The relevant parameters are measured with con- 
siderable precision. Thus our results appear to confirm the hypothesis of 
Blinder et al. (1980), although they think of this increment as an addition 
to the wage. We  obtain comparable results when we use social security 
wealth instead of payments. According to the likelihood values, however, 
the social security wealth specification appears to fit the data much better 
than the payments version. 
Poor health reduces the age of retirement substantially, by 1%-2% ac- 
cording to our estimates. Its effect is approximately equivalent to an in- 
crease of  $70 per month in social security payments between the ages of 62 
and 64, according to our results. Poor health has a somewhat greater ef- 
fect than a $10,000 increase in social security wealth between 62 and 64, 
based on specifications (3) and (4). Liquid assets also are associated with 
earlier retirement, but because we have not calculated the annuity value of 172  Jerry A. HausmadDavid A. Wise 
Table 6.7  Hazard Model Parameter Estimates (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
Variable 
SS payments, age 62-64 
SS payments,  age 5  65 
A SS payments 
SS wealth, age 62-64 
YS wealth, age 5  65 
A SS wealth 
Bad health 
Earnings (10,OOOs) 
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2000 
these assets their effect cannot be directly compared with the effects of so- 
cial security payments or wealth. 
Finally, we see that the more educated tend to retire later. An additional 
year of education is associated with about a 1.3% increase in the age of re- 
tirement. For example, suppose a person with 12 years of education would 
retire at age 60. We predict that a like person with 16 years of education 
would retire at age 63, all else equal. People with more dependent children 
are less likely to retire. 
The only anomalous result is the statistically insignificant effect of pri- 
vate pension eligibility. The RHS provides no details of  private pension 173  Social Security, Health Status, and Retirement 
plans, and we  suspect that the limited information that is available may 
simply be inadequate to reveal, even in a gross way, the effects of pension 
availability. 
It could be argued that since social security is dependent in large part on 
earnings, it may in principle be difficult to distinguish their effects. This 
possibility seems not to be evident in our results. All the relevant param- 
eters have theoretically plausible signs, with currently available assets in- 
creasing the likelihood of retirement and monetary rewards to working 
decreasing the likelihood of retirement. 
To give a better idea of the effects of social security on retirement, ac- 
cording to our estimates, we have performed several illustrative simula- 
tions. All of them begin with our sample of persons who were 60 years old 
and not retired in 1969. For this group, we first calculate the average prob- 
ability of being retired by ages 62, 64, and 66. Estimates are obtained us- 
ing both specifications (2) and (4) from table 6.7. These estimates are 
shown in the first column of table 6.8. 
The next column presents estimates with all of the social security values 
reduced by amounts reflecting the increases in primary insurance benefits 
between 1969 and 1975. According to these calculations, if  benefits had 
been maintained at the 1969 level approximately 3% fewer people would 
have been retired at age 64 (in 1973) and about 5% fewer at age 66 (in 
1975). 
These figures may be compared with the labor force participation rates 
shown in the introduction. The labor force participation rates of men 60- 
64 fell 9% between 1969 and 1973 and 13.7% between 1969 and 1975. For 
men over 65, labor force participation fell 14.5% between 1969 and 1973 
and 20% between 1969 and 1975. Thus the increase in social security bene- 
fits over this period may account for possibly one-third of the decrease, 
according to our estimates. Our estimates pertain to retirement status, of 
course, and a substantial number of retired persons are in the labor force. 
Table 6.8  Simulated Probabilities of  Retirement, by Age, for Selected Changes 
in Social Security Provision 
Current  SS Maintained  No SS 
Age  Law  at 1969 Level  62-64  No SS and No ASS 
Using SS Wealth (Specification 4) 
62  ,288  .288  ,221  .305 
64  .496  .48 1  ,320  .418 
66  .686  .655  ,613  .655 
Using SS Payments (Specification 2) 
62  .324  .322  .288  .278 
64  .510  .493  .411  .407 
66  .712  .674  .653  .650 174  Jerry A. HausmadDavid  A. Wise 
Our estimated effects of social security appear also to be somewhat low- 
er than those of Hurd and Boskin (1981), although their definition of  re- 
tirement corresponds more closely to labor force participation than ours 
does. A good deal of the effect they estimate could pertain to  persons who 
are retired by our definition. 
We  also simulated the effects of a much grosser change in social se- 
curity, allowing payments to begin at 65 instead of 62, but for persons 65 
and over assuming the benefits  that were actually available to this age 
group. The results are shown in columns 3 and 4 of tabulation 1, assuming 
in the third column that social security wealth (or payments) is zero for 
persons 62-64 and in the fourth column that the increment as well is set to 
zero. This simple procedure probably makes most sense with respect to 
payments.  According to this specification, such a scheme would reduce 
retirement rates at age 64 by about 20%  and at 66 by about 8%. Thus 
these estimates suggest that changes in social security benefit amounts and 
in particular the age at which they are awarded could have very substantial 
effects on retirement behavior. 
6.2  A Brownian Motion Retirement Process 
6.2.1  The Model 
The hazard model of retirement ignores one potentially important piece 
of information. No use of hours worked is made in that specification. We 
attempt to utilize this information in an alternative formulation of the re- 
tirement process,  based on changes in “desired hours” of  work.  In this 
specification,  changes  in  desired  hours of  work  occur with  changes in 
health  status, social security  wealth,  age,  and the monetary return to 
working. The basic idea is that if desired hours decrease to a sufficiently 
low level, the person  chooses to stop working altogether or to change 
jobs. Because of fixed costs of working, desired hours do not need to fall 
to zero for this change in job status to occur. We use hours worked infor- 
mation by specifying observed retirement status at time t as a function of 
observed hours as well as other variables at time t - 1. 
To begin, we  shall think of retirement  occurring when hours of  work 
fall below zero. We later relax this assumption. The analysis of a Brow- 
nian motion process depends on whether it is possible to move back and 
forth between the retired and non-retired states. If not, the process is said 
to be absorbing. For expository purposes, we shall first present the ideas 
assuming that retirement is not absorbing. Then we shall assume that it is. 
It is the second version that we estimate. (In practice, typically retirement 
from a primary job is absorbing,  but after retirement,  it is possible to 
move among levels of  work status, including zero hours.) Then we shall 
relax the implications inherent in this specification by considering desired 
hours of  work  versus potential  hours of work  on a primary job. This 175  Social Security, Health Status, and Retirement 
specification is motivated by the evidence in tables 6.5 and 6.6  that suggest 
little reduction in observed hours of work as one approaches retirement. 
Finally, we present parameter estimates, which must be considered  pre- 
liminary at this stage. 
If  Retirement Is Not Absorbing 
Suppose that the time path of  hours worked  by  an individual  who 
works H(0) = HO  hours at some starting age is described by the graph in 
figure 6.3. The slope u of the solid line represents the “drift” in hours 
worked as the person ages. The random deviation  E  from the drift is as- 
sumed to follow a Brownian motion (Weiner) process. That is, 
Every increment e(t + 6)  -  f(t)  is normally distributed with mean zero 
and variance u2d;  and 
The increments for every pair of  disjoint time intervals are indepen- 
dent. 
It is common to refer to  H(t)  as a Brownian motion process with drift u. 
The assumptions imply that at any time t,  E(t)  is normally distributed with 
mean zero and variance u2t.  And because the increments in the process are 
assumed independent, hours worked at time t + d,  given H(t),  is a func- 
tion only of hours worked at time t (and the drift u).  Given Ho,  the incre- 
ment by time t is normally distributed with mean ut and variance u2t,  that 
is, 
(10) 
where in our example u is negative. 
tired at age t,  given Ho,  is simply 
H(t) -  N(H0 + ut, &), 
If retirement means that H I  0, the probability that the person is re- 
r -w0  + ut) 1  H(0) = Hol  = dl  7- 
In other words, this is the probability that at time t the process was at least 
Ho  lower than it was at time zero, where the expected fall is ut and the vari- 
ance of the change is a2t. 
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Differences in individuals are accounted for by parameterizing the drift 
u. In theory, u could depend on Ho,  as well as other individual attributes 
like health. Because the values of variables like pension eligibility change 
with age, presumably the drift u will  also change. Thus we  propose a 
piecewise linear drift with kink points that correspond to ages at the time 
of the surveys. The graph of H(t)  might then look something like figure 
6.4, where the first survey is at age ti. Now, given that the individual was 
working HI  hours at age ti,  the probability of retirement at age t2  is 
Analogous expressions apply to subsequent age intervals. Note that the 
age of the first survey varies among individuals. 
The simplicity of this analysis results first from the conditioning on ini- 
tial hours of work and second from the assumption that retirement is not 
absorbing. In practice, however, retirement from a primary job is prob- 
ably absorbing for most people; it is typically not possible to return to 
work on that job. We  shall thus develop a specification analogous to the 
one above, but with retirement assumed to be absorbing. We shall not es- 
timate the model above to describe retirement but shall return to it in sub- 
sequent work to describe work “after retirement.”  In this case, the as- 
sumptions below seem more plausible to us. 
If  Retirement Is Absorbing 
Again we condition on initial observed hours NO,  where more generally 
initial time is when the first of any two consecutive surveys was conduct- 
ed. Because the density vanishes at zero, the process is no longer normally 
distributed at period t but obeys the probability density function 
(13) 
pW,t;Ho) = 
1  &zexp[-  2a2t 
1  (H -  Ho  -  ut)2 
19 
2uHo  (H + Ho  - ut)2 
2o2t 
-  exp [  - az- 
where the second of the exponentiated terms in the brackets is the result of 
the “sink” at zero. (See Cox and Miller 1965.) 
Again paralleling Cox and Miller, the probability that retirement has 
occurred at age t,  given HO  and absorption at zero hours, is 177  Social Security, Health Status, and Retirement 




This is analogous to the function G(t)  in section 6.1. The probability den- 
sity function corresponding to the time of absorption is then given by 
This is the counterpart to the proportional hazard density in equation (2). 
The likelihood function for this model is formed from the expression 
for p(*)  in equation (13) and G(.)  in equation (14). That is, the person 
either is working at level H,  with likelihoodp(  a),  or has retired, with prob- 
ability G.  Observations from the first survey are used only to condition 
the observed outcome at the time of the second survey. (In future work we 
shall enter an expression for the likelihood of the first-survey outcome.) 
Persons are followed only through the survey period in which they retired, 
at which point they are presumed to have been absorbed into the retire- 
ment state. 
This analysis is based on the implicit assumption that hours of work can 
be reduced continuously until the person no longer wants to work at all; 
then retirement occurs. But suppose that the alternative to retirement is 
working the customary hours on a primary job, as suggested by the sum- 
mary data presented above. The specification  in the next section is intend- 
ed to address this concern. 
If  Desired Hours Diverge from Production Practice 
Suppose now that we think of desired hours of work decreasing with 
age, like actual hours of work in the section above. We  use H to indicate 
desired hours. Suppose that actual observed hours, denoted by A,  may di- 
verge by an amount d from desired hours. Assume that observed hours be- 
fore retirement represent required hours on the primary job. Finally, sup- 
pose that an individual retires if desired hours fall below a.  These ideas are 
reflected in figure 6.5. 178  Jerry A. HausmadDavid A. Wise 
Fig. 6.5 
The person will retire by t if during this period H(t)  falls from Ho + d to 
a,  that is, if the process falls by an amount (Po  + 6)  -  a.  Of course, we do 
not observe d or a,  only PO.  To develop the likelihood of this outcome, we 
shall begin by writing out the probability that the process H(t)  falls from 
H(0)  to the level a by t.  First we write the probability density function for 
Hat  age t,  given the initial position Ho  and the absorbing barrier at a,  as 
dH,t;Ho,  a) = 
1  H -  Ho  -  ut)* 




The probability that retirement has occurred by t is given by 
G(tlH0,a) = 
["-%"'  I 
(17)  =1-1-q) 
2u(a -  Ho 
a2 
a -  HO - ut 
-(a -  Ho) -  ut  + exp( 
2u(a -  Ho 
cr2  + exp( 
a -  HO - ut  =4 6 
-(a -  Ho) -  ut 
-3 
If a = 0, equations (16) and (17) reduce to equations (13) and (14), respec- 
tively. Note that G gives the probability that the process falls from Ho  to a, 
sometime before t. 
We would like to know the probability that the process falls from go  + 
d to a. If we substitute PO  + d for HO  in equation (17), then the terms a - 
HO  in (17) become a -  d -  = b -  A. We of course know neither a nor 
d.  Suppose, however, that b varies randomly across individuals. In this in- 
stance it is natural to assume that b is distributed normally, say with mean 
vb and variance a;.  If this density is denoted by f,  then the probability of 179  Social Security, Health Status, and Retirement 
retirement for an individual with unknown b is obtained integrating over 
all values of b,  giving 
(18) 
At least the deviation d = HO - RO  is likely to depend on age. Thus in 
principle we should allow shifts in Ub with age. The estimates below, how- 
ever, allow only for a single b. 
6.1.2  Estimates 
At its current stage of development the outstanding weakness of the 
model is that it does not allow for permanent unobserved individual ef- 
fects. We intend to extend the specification to the case of unobserved indi- 
vidual effects in subsequent work. We give the first set of  results in table 
6.9. The results in columns 1 and 3 are based on the equations (13) and 
(14) in section 6.2 above. Those in columns 2 and 4 are based on the speci- 
fications in section 6.3, and allow the absorbing barrier to be estimated. 
The variable definitions coincide with the definitions used in table 6.7 for 
the hazard model. The results are considerably easier to interpret than the 
hazard results because the implicit left-hand variable is desired weekly 
hours. 
In the first column note that the size of social security payments has an 
important effect on desired hours, with the size of payments after age 65 
having a larger effect. But the change in social security payments has a 
negative sign-indicating  that, contrary to expectation, desired hours fall 
with expected increases from working. The effect is estimated very pre- 
cisely. The effect on desired hours of  work, however, is very small, less 
than one hour per $100 increase in the payment increment, for example. 
Earnings have the expected effect, although the size of the effect is again 
small. Bad health and pension eligibility both have large and significant 
effects on desired hours. In column 2 we estimate a more general specifi- 
cation by allowing the absorbing barrier to differ from zero as in our sec- 
ond model. The estimate of the barrier is about four hours, which leads to 
a small decrease in the magnitude of the other coefficient estimates. How- 
ever, the relative magnitudes remain constant for the effects of the right- 
hand-side variables. 
In column 3 we replace social security payments and their change with 
social security wealth measures. The model does not fit the data as well, in 
contrast  to our findings for the hazard model.  Neither social security 
wealth before age 65 nor earnings significantly affects desired hours. Fur- 
thermore, the change in social security wealth again has the “wrong” sign, 
although its effect on desired hours is small. The effects of bad health, 
pension eligibility, and the socioeconomic variables are quite similar to  the 
results for the model with social security payments instead of social secu- 
rity wealth. 
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Table 6.9  Brownian Motion Process Parameter Estimates (Standard Errors in 
Parentbeses) 
Variable 
SS payments, age 62-64 
SS payments, age L  65 
A SS payments (100s) 
SS wealth, age 62-64 
SS wealth, age z 65 
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6.3  Conclusions 
Our results suggest a strong effect of  social security benefits on the 
probability of retirement. Increases in real earnings decrease the likeli- 
hood of  retirement.  Increases in future social security benefits decrease 
the probability of retirement, according to the results we find the most re- 
liable. Our major conclusions are based on a hazard model specification 
of retirement. We  also presented a Brownian motion formulation of re- 
tirement and presented some initial results based on it. Our hope is that 
future work will yield a more satisfactory version of the model. 181  Social Security, Health Status, and Retirement 
Notes 
1. Other recent applications  of the hazards model are Diamond and Hausman (1982) and 
2. From selected issues of Employment and Earnings, table A-4. 
3. We  standardize  by setting the mean of  the distribution equal to one. Sensitivity of the 
results to the distribution assumptions is investigated by Lancaster (1979), Lancaster and 
Nickell (1980), Baldwin (1983), and Heckman and Singer (1984). 
4. See Gustman and Steinmeier  (1981) for similar evidence. 
Flynn and Heckman (1982). 
Comment  Gary Burtless 
This paper contains a careful assessment of alternative mathematical rep- 
resentations of the retirement process. Contrary to the promise implied by 
its title, the paper is only tangentially concerned with effects of health and 
social security on retirement. Its main concern is accurate statistical repre- 
sentation of processes that occur over time. Two representations are con- 
sidered. The first section contains an analysis using a hazard-rate model. 
The second contains a novel representation of continuous time processes, 
which the authors refer to as a “Brownian motion” model. 
There are several fundamental problems in modeling the retirement 
process. Unlike consumption of margarine or housing or trips to Disney- 
land, there is no natural translation of retirement into a consumption rate 
per unit of time. One either is or is not retired. And in most cases retire- 
ment, like death, is an “absorbing” state: one seldom returns. 
This would present no special problems if all the factors affecting retire- 
ment were constant, or at least reasonably so, before the actual date of re- 
tirement. In that case, exogenous variables relevant to estimation would 
essentially be fixed at the start of the lifetime or working life. The analyst 
could proceed with estimation exactly as he does in estimating an ordinary 
demand relationship, with “fraction of expected lifetime devoted to re- 
tirement” being the dependent variable instead of consumption of marga- 
rine or housing services or whatever. 
Of course, there are a couple of  special problems. Retirement must be 
defined, which is not an easy task when some individuals define them- 
selves as retired even though working 40 hours a week, while others persist 
in saying they’re not retired even though they have not worked full time 
for years. Another problem is that we do not observe expected lifetimes, 
nor do we necessarily observe retirement ages for all persons in a cohort. 
Some respondents have not retired by the last survey date, so their retire- 
ment ages are unobserved. Death also interferes with unbiased estima- 
tion. If a respondent dies before he retires, the analyst is denied the oppor- 
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tunity of  observing  a  retirement  age.  From the point of  view  of  the 
analyst-though  not of  the respondent-this  is an inconvenience much 
like the case of nonretirement. 
The problems just mentioned can be surmounted using due care as well 
as modern statistical models that handle sample censorship. In fact, ex- 
cept for the now trivial problem of  censorship, with sufficiently good ob- 
servations one could estimate demand for retirement using ordinary least 
squares. 
But the major problem in estimation is the fact that most factors affect- 
ing retirement are changing, even as the retirement decision is being made. 
Someone previously in good health has a heart attack at age 55. Someone 
steadily employed on a $10-an-hour job is unexpectedly laid off, perhaps 
permanently. Unanticipated  inflation erodes the value of a pension enti- 
tlement. These changes alter the economic trade-offs involved in retire- 
ment. The margarine consumer can take the price of margarine as well as 
other relevant  factors to be fixed in making his weekly or monthly pur- 
chases, and the economist can analyze this consumption behavior accord- 
ingly. But the case of retirement is much less straightforward. 
A common way to get around this problem is to analyze retirement over 
only a very short period, such as a year. The idea is that the variables 
affecting retirement are unlikely to change much over this period, so un- 
anticipated changes can be safely ignored. The obvious problem with this 
strategy is that the sample of nonretirees at the beginning of some interest- 
ing year-say  age 62-is  highly self-selected.  It excludes all individuals 
whose tastes or circumstances caused them to retire before age 62. So the 
results  cannot be  generalized  to the whole  population without  strong 
untested assumptions. Considering all individuals’ statuses-rather  than 
changes in status-at  age 62 causes a  different  kind  of  problem.  The 
characteristics  that initially caused retirees in this sample to retire may 
have changed by age 62, although their retirement status obviously has 
not. Consequently, the factors inducing retirement  are only partially ob- 
served. 
The contribution of Hausman and Wise is to offer two mathematical 
formulations of the retirement  process that get around these problems. 
They essentially observe 10 years of individuals’ lives and then try to  mod- 
el the dynamic process that causes them to retire before, during, or after 
that interval. 
Their first model is based on the hazard or time-to-failure model first 
popularized in the biometrics literature, and subsequently applied in so- 
ciological work on marital separations and in economic research on the 
duration of unemployment spells. It is assumed that consumers have two 
choices at any point in time, to remain at work or to become retired. In 
any unit of time a certain fraction of individuals will choose to retire. By 
selecting  a convenient  mathematical  representation  of  that probability 183  Social Security, Health Status, and Retirement 
density, the authors can easily compute the finite probability that retire- 
ment will occur between any two arbitrarily selected points. The method 
of maximum likelihood estimation finds those parameter values that most 
closely fit the observed retirement patterns in the sample, including retir- 
ees, nonretirees, and the deceased. It is then straightforward to modify 
this density function to  take account of variables such as race and sex that 
are fixed over time. Essentially these factors have a proportional impact 
on the probability density, raising or lowering the chance of retirement as 
the case may be. The authors further modify their specification to permit 
these variables to have impacts that vary in different time periods-before 
and after age 65, for example. Individual-specific random differences are 
also introduced, though I wonder what practical effect this has on the pa- 
rameter estimates. 
To take care of time-varying variables-such  as wealth, wages, and so- 
cial security entitlements-the  authors essentially divide up the individ- 
ual’s lifetime into short time periods-two-year  intervals-and  then as- 
sume  that  in  each  period  the  variable  has  an effect  on retirement 
probabilities that is proportional to  its average value in that period. 
The estimates from this model indicate that social security has an ex- 
tremely modest effect. They show that the 20% increase in real benefit 
levels in 1972 reduced the fraction of men working at age 64 by 1.5 per- 
centage points, from around half to slightly less than half. It reduced the 
fraction working at age 66 by about 3 percentage points. These results are 
very similar to those recently obtained by Robert Moffitt and me (Burtless 
and Moffitt 1985). In obtaining our results we used the same data set as 
Hausman and Wise but a substantially different representation of  the re- 
tirement process. 
But the authors are unsatisfied with the economic underpinnings of the 
hazard rate model, so they go on to estimate a “Brownian motion” mod- 
el. The idea here is that retirement takes place when an unobserved index 
of work preferences falls below a critical threshold value. They call this 
unobserved  index  “desired  hours,”  and they  assume the index trends 
downward during advanced age, though it also has random disturbances 
that may cause it to rise temporarily at certain ages. Estimates from this 
ingenious model are not very satisfactory, and I find them less easy to in- 
terpret because they are expressed in terms of unobserved desired hours 
rather than in more natural units of measurement, for example, average 
retirement ages or retirement probabilities per year. The sign of one of the 
social security coefficients is opposite to the one expected. This coefficient 
shows, contrary to the earlier result, that as the gain in future social secu- 
rity  benefits  from extra  work  rises,  nonretirees  desire  to work fewer 
hours. 
I shall give my reactions to the two models in reverse order. The second 
model does not seem to  me an improvement over the first, so I am not sure 184  Jerry A. HausmadDavid A. Wise 
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Note: The number in parentheses is the number of observations used to calculate the associ- 
ated mean. 
why the authors felt it was needed. They state or imply that the economic 
rationale for the first model is unconvincing, but they do not show why 
the second model is better. In a future version of the paper, their reasoning 
needs to be made clearer. 
I do not see why unobserved “desired hours’’ are a better way to model 
retirement than the simpler on/off representation implicit in the hazard 185  Social Security, Health Status, and Retirement 
Age 
~~  _____ 
Table 6.A.2  Mean Hours of Work per Week for Non-Self-Employed Men, by Age 
and Year,  Excluding Fully or Partially Retired 
~  ~~~  ~ 
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41.4  41.5 
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Note: The number in parentheses is the number of observations used to calculate the associ- 
ated mean. 
rate model. As the authors’ own statistics on average weekly hours show, 
there is no tendency for actual (as opposed to  desired) hours to  decline pri- 
or to retirement. Why assume that the underlying process causing retire- 
ment is any different from the process we typically observe? What we ob- 
serve is a steady level of work effort until the retirement age, at which 
point work effort drops significantly. 186  Jerry A. HausmadDavid A. Wise 
Table 6.A.3  Mean Hours of  Work  per Week  for Self-Employed Men, by Age and 
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40.4  35.2 
31.3  32.7 
31.0 
All Years 
Nore: The number in parentheses is the number of observations used to calculate the associ- 
ated mean. 
Their hazard rate model is extremely well implemented and explained, 
although I think they should go into more detail in explaining their repre- 
sentation of  time-varying variables: What are the implications of  their 
particular specification? 187  Social Security, Health Status, and Retirement 
Table 6.A.4  Mean Hours of Work per Week  for Self-Employed Men, by Age and 
Year,  Excluding Fully or Partially Retired 
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Note: The number in parentheses is the number of observations used to calculate the associ- 
ated mean. 
My final comment should not be taken as a criticism of this work but as 
a statement of how far we  still need to go  in this kind of research.  The 
main problem with these models, it seems to me, is that they take full ac- 
count of a worker’s history but no account of his potential history. For ex- 188  Jerry A. HausmadDavid A. Wise 
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ample, consider the social security entitlement. The hazard rate model in- 
tegrates over all past values of  potential social security entitlements the 
worker might have had up to his observed age at retirement. All potential 
entitlements he might receive from working one extra year in the future, 
or two or 10 extra years, are ignored. But of course these potential entitle- 189  Social Security, Health Status, and Retirement 
Table 6.A.6  Mean Hours of Work  per Week  for Women, by Age and Year, 
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Note: The  number in parentheses is the number of observations used to calculate the associ- 
ated mean. 
ments and their rate of change may be exactly the factors motivating the 
worker when he chooses to retire. Consider the worker who retires at age 
64, perhaps because he was laid off. Why does he not attempt to find an- 
other job? Why does he choose, instead, to retire? Perhaps because the 
rate of return from added work, in terms of added social security wealth, 190  Jerry A. HausmadDavid A. Wise 
drops sharply at age 65. His decision is motivated by the  future drop in so- 
cial security entitlements rather than by the change he is now experiencing 
or has experienced in the past. 
This is just a special case of the nonlinear budget constraint problem 
that Hausman and Wise understand very well: Since the price of retire- 
ment is not constant, to properly model the consumer’s choice the analyst 
should include all the relevant prices-including  the prices the consumer 
chooses not to face. By ignoring future retirement prices, the hazard mod- 
el may misrepresent the retirement process. However, in view of the pro- 
gress this  paper  represents  over most  past  models of  retirement, this 
should be considered a relatively minor quibble. 
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